Nuancing the Pure: The Marks of Rothko by Thomas, Morgan
Nuancing the Pure:
The Marks of Rothko
Morgan Thomas
The historical period thai the avant-garde shared with modernism is
over. That seems an obvious fact. Whal makes it more than a
journalistic one is a conception ofthe discourse that has brought it
to a close. This is a complex ofcultural practices, among them a
demythologizing criticism and a truly postmodernist an, both of
them acting now to void the basic propositions ofmodernism, to
liquidate them by exposing their fictitious condition. It is thus from a
strange new perspective that we look back on the modernist origin
and watch it splintering into endless replication.
Rosalind Krauss. 'The Originality of Lhe Avant-Garde' \
There is no passion in nature so demoniacally impatient as that of
him, who shuddering on the edge ofa precipice, thus meditates a
plunge. To indulge for a moment, in any attempt at thought. is to be
inevitably lost; for reflection but urges us to forbear, and therefore it
is, I say, that we canflOt ... Examine these and similar actions as we
will, we shall find them resulting solely from the spirit ofthe
Perverse.
Edgar Allan Poe. 'The Imp of Lhe Perverse,2
Like the 'modernist myth' of originality analysed by Rosalind Krauss.
the notion of purity has fallen into disrepute among art historians in
recent years. It may be, however, that demythologising criticism of the
kind advocated by Krauss tends to miss the mark of the purity that it
aims to invalidate or 'void'. One manifestation ofthe 'new perspective'
on modernism heralded by Krauss is Mark Cheetham's The Rhetoric
of Purity. Similarly claiming an approach to art history informed by
postmoderni st and deconstructive thought, the argument ofCheetham's
book is that an essentialist model of purity constitutes one of the 'basic
propositions' of modernist abstraction in the twentieth century. As
with Krauss, it is the critical power of postrnodern discursivity that in
this account brings to a close the dominating force of the notion of
purity in art, at the same time exposing it as another modernist myth.
And yet, is this perspective as strange or as new as it declares itself to
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be-or as free of the purity it claims to have superseded? Was purity
and its relation to modernist abstraction so straightforward? I suggest,
on the contrary, that if we consider the ambivalent articulation of the
'pure' and the 'aesthetic' in Kant's thought and in a post-Kantian
aesthetic tradition, we see something like a shadow-play occurring
between the 'pure' and the 'impure' with regard to modem art and
aesthetics. This co-implication of purity and impurity also marks the
history of abstraction. The treaonent of colour in Mark Rothko's
'signature paintings' is examined here not only for its instantiation of
what one might call the necessary perversity of aesthetic purity, but
also in order to call into question the value accorded to the discursive
over the non-discursive in contemporary art criticism, which too often
entails a forgetting of the painting of modernist painting. Looking at
these works, we see amarking ofdifferences that derives its force from
a 'pure' nuancing of colour, a nuancing that isolates what we might
call-now more than ever-the stain of the painterly.
How does such an approximation of pure and impure take place?
Let us consider, briefly and schematically. some ways in which notions
of purity and impurity may be tied to art and aesthetics. An 'aesthetic
of purity' is said to motivate a work of art, a movement, a manner. A
judgment is said to be 'purely aesthetic' or 'aesthetically pure'. In each
of these cases it is not easy to determine which of these terms being
linked delimits the other. Some contingency or resistance bctween
them-the possibility of apurity that is not aesthetic, the possibility of
an aesthetic that is not pure-is intimated by thcir conjunction. These
possibilities can be taken together: it is only in so far as it is not
pure, not purely pure, that the aesthctic is purely aesthetic; it is its
irreducible difference from 'pure' purity-from moral or some other
nonaesthetic purity-that makes the aesthetic purely aesthetic. As
soon as the pure can be divided in this way, as soon as there is more
than one purity, the pure ceases to be absolutely pure. When one speaks
of the pure presence of a colour or a painting. or of the pure response
it elicits, a certain corruption of the pure has already taken place-
through the delimitation of the aesthetic. A similar approximation
occurs when, conversely, the opposition ofpure and impure divides the
field of the aesthetic. I f we were to describe a style of art as absolutely
impure, it would be purely impure and therefore not absolutely impure.
We can see that the impure cannot be thought without the pure, and
vice versa: an aesthetic of purity implies a contamination of the purity
that underwrites it; an art of contamination remains involved in the
pure, cannot do without it, indeed draws from and is drawn by it.
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For a more concrete indication of this approximation of aesthetic
purity and impurity, there is-ironically enough-no better place to
look than The Rhetoric of Purity. This study focuses on Gauguin,
S~rusierand, primarily, Mondrian and Kandinsky, as key figures in the
history of a paradigmatically 'essentialist' abstract painting, defined
by its search for purity in art. According to Cheetham, the te/os of
purity 'powered the initiation ofabstract painting to a very considerable,
if not exclusive extent' ,3 finding its frame of reference in what is seen
to be an ultimately Platonist conception oftruth as essence, immaterial,
perfect, and absolute. The turn to abstraction in modernist painting
would in this way constitute art's apology (in Plato's sense) for art
before a tradition condemning it as inherently inimical to truth.
Modernist abstraction would be the means by which art seeks to mime
the nonmimetic truth (the 'pure' truth) of the essentialist tradition,
repeating its devaluation ofsemblance in pursuit of 'the static perfection
of the absolute'.4 The notion of purity, Cheetham writes, represents
'quite literally a way to close down the material practice of all art'.5
Among the multitude ofsigns that here attest to the pervasive power
of the notion of purity in modernist abstract painting are Gauguin's
practice of painting from memory and use of intense, non-naturalistic
colours, the exclusion of the feminine implied in Mondrian's figure
of the hermaphrodite as well as his reduced palette and reliance
on orthogonals, and the 'binary' contrasts and 'curative' apocalyptic
references seen to be operative in the work of Kandinsky. A postscript
on Paul KJee, however, detects in his work a 'plastic discursiveness'
seen to represent an 'edifying rejection' of the rhetoric of purity and
the silencing of discourse that apparently goes with it.6 KJee thus
furnishes the point of articulation between the two opposed rhetorics at
issue in this book, outlined in the following terms:
A postmodem, rhetorical investigation is in fact a much needed
antidote to the perennially seductive appeal to purity in art and society.7
Cheetham's polemic evidently involves a reassertion of the edifying
value of art and the submission of the judgment of art to moral and
cultural criteria. In effect, post modern impurity issues a corrective to
modern purity:
My interest in and critique of purity in abstract painting has arisen
within what Iwould call the postmodem preoccupation with impurity....
Posunodemism's relentless discursivity saves it from transcendence




What is striking, reading Cheetham's account, is its blind
perpetuation of the logic of purification that it is apparently contesting.
One might almost say that in this book the impure is the pure and the
pure is the impure. The more impure art is, the more edifying it will be;
conversely, the pure in art is understood to be 'unsavoury', a disease
requiring an 'antidote'. The reason it does so is that it assumes a
straightforward opposition between the terms which are taken to be
alternatives, with the preferability of an inherently impure discursivity
being advocated.9 Yet it is surely not simply a matter oferadicating the
purity that contaminates art; the fact that Cheetham's argument turns
back on itsel f betrays this di fficuIty. A further point to note is how far
the model of purity being summoned here in relation to art rests
primarily on the hypostatisation of a purely essentialist Platonism-
which mutates into an 'aesthetic ideology' seeking to make good a
Platonic hostility to art-and to ask whether this is sufficient for an
examination of the notion of purity and how it acts upon the modem
tradition in art. From this perspective. the triumph of an aesthetic of
impurity is, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. It is also significant that
the model of aesthetic purity under consideration scarcely encounters
its Kantian and post-Kantian inflections and the difference they mark
in instituting a modern aesthetic tradition-a tradition in which a
certain autonomy and purity is accorded the aesthetic as such and in
which it is not simply truth that is in question.
An adequate account of the ways in which notions of the aesthetic
and the pure are articulated in Kant's critical philosophy is hardly
possible here. It may be useful. nevertheless, to consider the movement
of both terms as they are deployed in Kant's text and their part in
opening up a modem thinking of art and judgment. Pure and aesthetic
though this judgment may be. the necessary uncertainty which marks
the thinking ofart in this tradition leaves little promise of an unchanging
and absolute truth.
Even though the word 'pure' (rein)1O abounds in Kant's writing,
there is an inconsistency in its usage that is less apparent in the use of
related terms like'a priori'. 'transcendental', and 'absolute' . The word
is sometimes used to mean 'original'; more often, it carries a sense of
negation, of the mere, of being or doing without: it is 'not mixed with
anything extraneous'; it is 'devoid of .. .'. In particular it frequently
indicates an absence ofempirical content-Kant in this manner isolates
'pure' intuition from the sensations that provide the matter of sensible
knowledge; similarly, it is its non-cognitive, disinterested character
that makes pure aesthetic pleasure pure. Yet it is also possible to find
34
Morgan Thomas
references to 'pure empiricism' in the Critique of Pure Reason.!1
What is evident is the mobility of the word in Kant's usage, at times
seeming to serve as a kind of writer's tic or filler, without definite
content or 'essence'-yet acting not so much as an empty signifier than
as a signifier of emptying, or (to use Samuel Becken's word) of
lessness.
The 'Transcendental Aesthetic' with which Kant's Critique ofPure
Reason begins deals with the power of sensibility to be receptive to
matter (sensation) and to impose on it the 'pure' forms of time (the
inner sense) and space (the outer sense). Its place at the opening of the
course of Kant's enquiry, and the transcendental privilege that marks
this place. in this way assigns an irreducible priority to the aesthetic. It
is furthermore the transcendental status of the aesthetic that blocks any
possibility of acceding to knowledge of things in themselves through
'intellectual' intuition; in this way. the place of the aesthetic opens up
a fundamental division between the powers of (aesthetic) sensibility
and (logical) understanding. entailing the necessity of what Howard
Caygill calls a 'balancing act'l2 as Kant attempts to articulate their
different yet complementary functions in the system of knowledge
that the Critique seeks to secure. It is the imagination that in effect
performs this balancing act in Kant's text: uniquely placed in par-
taking of both the receptivity of sensibility and the spontaneity of the
understanding. the imagination is ahle to mediate between these two
incomensurable powers. allowing the sensible and the intelligible to
communicate. In Kant's account of schematism. which deals with
precisely this difficulty. the imagination is said to produce a schema
(or monogram) by way of 'an image for aconcept'. with the difference
that the schema preconditions and exceeds the restrictive concretion of
the empirical image: it is merely thought. Schematism is-
an art [eine Kunst) concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose
real modes of activity nature is hardly ever likely to have open to our
gaze. This much only we can assert: the image is a product of the
empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible
concepts, such as of figures in space, is a product and, as it were, a
monogram, of pure a priori imagination, through which, and in
accordance with which, images themselves frrst become possible. 13
This prefiguring art of schematism, required in judgment, is arguably
pivotal to the entire architectonic of reason envisaged by Kant (of
which the Critique of Pure Reason would be the outline). Kant's
recurrent allusions to the monogram, in panicular, point to an
ambivalence with regard to this power of the imagination-the risk
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that, in introducing an ultimately aesthetic excess into the order of
reason, it compromises the integrity of that very order. 14
In the Critique ofAesthetic Judgment Kant returns to the question
ofjudgment and the 'peculiar' principle that guides 'those judgments,
called aesthetic, which concern the beautiful and the sublime in nature
or in art' .15 In the third Critique, the aesthetic is no longer considered
in terms of its contribution to knowledge and the determinant judgments
which, in applying concepts to particulars, would constitute such
knowledge. Aesthetic judgment produces no knowledge; it is not
determinant but reflective in moving from the singular to the general.
Its peculiarity lies in the fact that the judging subject need only consult
a subjective feeling in making the judgment; yet for all its subjective
character, aesthetic judgment does not take place without the singular
offering of a sensible impression. The meaning of the term 'aesthetic'
is again transformed at the point when. in judgments of taste, what
'pleases' is not the agreeability of sensations as such. but the form of
given sensations-their 'shape' or 'play' .16 The dis-interestedness of
pure aesthetic pleasure thus marks a certain autonomy or freedom of
judgment in the midst of the sensible. This autonomy, where the 'free
play' of a purely productive imagination is tied to the self-regulative
power of reflective judgment, is also vital to Kant's account of fine art,
which must be free and offer the 'pleasure of reflection',17 and to his
account of genius, an exemplary talent which requires
the ability to exhihit aesthetic ideas ... apresentation of the imagination
which prompts much thought. but to which no determinate thought
whatsoever. i.e. no concept. can be adequate, so that no language can
express it completely and allow us to grac;p iLI8
The aesthetic idea, Kant goes on to suggest. would be nothing less
than the counterpart, or 'pendant'. of the rational idea. 19
Without elaborating on the exorbitant privilege that comes to be
attached to art and aesthetics in the modern philosophical tradition
after Kant. we should recognise that acertain autonomisation of art and
the fragmentation ofexperience that accompanies it are consistentJy at
issue in this tradition. Notwithstanding the privilege that it accords to
nature over art in its exposition of aesthetic judgment in the work of
Adorno. Greenberg, Fried. and Lyotard. among others, Kantian thought
remains dccisi ve insetting up questions that bear on the experimentation
-and particularly the abstraction-that marks modern art. What takes
places with Kant and Hegel. and in their wake, is then not only an
aestheticisation-more or less qualified--Qf philosophical thinking
but with it a tum in art towards experimentation. critical reflection and
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speculation. The former does not simply amount to a contamination of
philosophy by art, any more than the latter is reducible to a process of
purification. Both partake in reflection and experimentation.
A figure that is strikingly uncenain with regard to purity in Kant's
text is colour, and in particular mixed colour:
sensations of color as well as of tone claim to deserve ... being
considered beautiful only insofar as they are pure ... mixed colors do
not enjoy this privilege, precisely because. since they are not simple.
we lack a standard for judging whether we should call them pure or
impure.20
The liminal status of colour here raises the question of why. in The
Rhetoric 0/Purity. discursivity should be presented as the exclusive or
primary alternative to aesthetic purity, especially when this book
concerns painting-it almost seems that any non-discursive marking
condemns itself, a priori. to purity. It is true that Kant's distinction
between the possible beauty of pure colours and the doubtful purity
of mixed colours loses its peninence in Hegel's Aesthetics, where
the exclusion of the merely sensory is not immediately at stake and
where the 'magic of the pure appearance of colour' is invoked.2t
Colour is admitted into purity in Hegel's account: it is not that impurity
has been admitted into the aesthetic but rather that the delimitation
ofaesthetic purity has accommodated the materiality of painting. Even
so, it is precisely this modern mobility of purity and with it a cenain
aestheticisation of the pure, evident in the case of colour, that is
missing from Cheetham's account.
This absence appears most problematic in Cheetham's study when
it is argued that the perennial seduction of aesthetic purity continues
'cyclically' after the European ahstraction of Mondrian and Kandinsky.
returning in the 'transcendental aspirations of Abstract Expressionism
---only to be countered by the impurities of Pop' .22 How does colour
figure in this account. bearing in mind Kant's precarious distinction of
pure and nonpure colours? Discussing the use of colour in Pop An.
Roland Barthes writes:
Pop art's colours are ... subject to a style. Pop colour is openly
chemical; it aggressively refers to the artifice ofchemistry ... And if we
admit that, in the plastic domain, colour is ordinarily the site of pulsion.
these acrylics. these flat primaries. these lacquers, in short these
colours which are never shades. since nuance is banished/rom them,
seek to cut short desire, emotion: we might say, at the limit, that they




Barthes in this passage reverses the 'cycle' of purity and impurity
proposed by Cheetham, suggesting adifferent possibility: that Pop Art
can be read not as the impure counterpoint to Abstract Expressionism,
but rather as the moment at which chromatic purification implies a
detachment-not unlike a Kantian disinterestedness, perhaps-that is
at once moral and aesthetic in character and which is decisive in
elevating Pop to the status of art. What then of the colours, the nuances
that sometimes are shades, the nuances which, according to Barthes,
were eliminated by Pop-and in particular, what of those paintings of
Rothko's that seem to eliminate everything but this nuancing \.If
colour? lltis is not to say that they are the impure counterpoint to Pop
Art; it is rather to show that aesthetic impurity cuts both ways.
Let us recall three remarks of Rothko's concerning the place of
colour in his painting. The first seems to disqualify in advance the
relevance of colour, and abstraction in general, from his work:
I'm not interested in relations of color or form ... I'm not an
abstractionisl.. .. And if you, as you say. are moved only by their
color relationships. then you miss the poin1.24
The second, from undated working notes, appears to reject colourism,
but not the importance of colours:
I use colors that have already been experienced through the light of day
... my colors are not colors that are laboratory tools which are isolated
from all accidentals or impurities so that they have a specified identity
or purity.25
The third, from discussion following a talk given at the Pratt Institute
in 1958, concerns colour and line:
People have asked me if I was involved in color. Yes, that's all there is,
but I am not against line. I don't use it because it would have detracted
from the clarity of what I had to say ... In a way my paintings are very
exact, but in that exactitude there is a shimmer ... in weighing the
edges to introduce a less rigorous, play elemen1.26
How are these statements to be reconciled with one other-and with
the evidence of the paintings? How would they be reconciled, for
example, with paintings titled Orange and Yellow, Orange and Red on
Red, Green and Tangerine on Red, Red and Violet over Red, Green on
Blue? The sheer limpidity of these titles poses akind ofriddle-a point
which we will return to. It is necessary first of all, however, to think
about some of the techniques Rothko used in painting-an aspect of
his work of which he said little-and about the particular disposition of
colour which characterises his work.
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An essay on Rothko's technique by Dana Cranmer focuses on his
manipulation of the physical components of paint mixtures in his
painting, and particularly the thinning of paint. Rothko often used oil
paint in combination with synthetic paints, including house-paint,
sometimes with the addition of unbound powdered pigments and
whole eggs.27 Paint films differing with respect to their material
components and consistency were applied layer upon layer, with both
the number of layers and the drying time between applications subject
to variation. The practice ofdiluting pai nt with sol vent allowed Rothko
to transfer to oil painting effects and techniques derived from his
extensive work in watercolour. Rothko would add so much solvent to
his paint formula, Cranmer writes,
that the effect of the binding element in the paint mixture was
compromised; the pigment particles were almost disassociated from
the paint film, barely clinging to the surface. Rothko ignored the limits
of physical coherence to achieve translucency ... Light penetrated the
attenuated paint film, striking the individual pigment particles ...
Physically. these surfaces are extremely delicate if not ephemeral.28
Rothko further refined this effect of translucency by applying
layers of egg white in between layers of paint-engendering a further
'disassociation' of layers-a traditional technique alluded to in a
fifteenth-century handbook and used by Poussin.29
According to the art critic Thomas Hess, it was Rothko who, among
his contemporaries, initiated the procedure of thinning oil paint, a
procedure also adopted by Jackson Pollock and later taken up by Helen
Frankenthaler and Morris Louis.30 This thinning of paint can have the
effect of 'staining' the canvas. In Greenberg's formulation, in making
the colour coincident with the canvas, staining tends to be a statement
of the painting's flatness. Yet this interpretation fails to gauge the
effect of staining in Rothko's painting, where the paint is thinned
to considerably varying degrees, which, combined with its layered
application, opens up the possibility of variations in tone, chromatic
intensity and depth. An assertion of the surface is in general tempered
by greater or smaller variations in hue and saturation (for which the
other technical term is purity) which continue to conjure effects of
pictorial depth and volume and in particular adiscontinuous disposition
of light, sometimes appearing 'translucent', sometimes matte,
sometimes both at once. This treatment of painting materials and the
techniques of disassociation. combination, and superimposition it
involves, results neither in a Kantian purity of colour nor in the
chromatic' fusion' that Hegel invokes.31 It partakes ofboth orientations,
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mixing what does not mix and 'disassociating' what should cohere.
·The same curious logic applies to Rothko's meticulous attention
(despite his disclaimers) to the volatility of colour relationships, a
volatility which extends beyond the picture's edge. In preparation for
an exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery in 1961, Rothko issued the
following specifications:
Walls should be made considerahly off-white with umher and warmed
by a lillie red. If the walls are too white, they arc also fighting against
the pictures which tum greenish because of the predominance of red in
the pictures,32
An analogous separation and non-separation of elements
characterises the chromatic disposition of the paintings themselves.
In The Ochre (1954). a stark difference between orange and pale
yellow is framed by a less apparent difference between the orange of
the lower rectangular area and the weaker or thinner orange that frames
and (perhaps) underlies both zones. At first glance this painting
could appear to present a rectangular yellow zone over an orange field.
The stark di fference of orange and yellow is supplemented by a
more elusive difference-a difference of consistency or complexion
-between orange and orange. The former difference seems almost
irreducible: the laner is delicate. The painting might in this way display
the 'kinship and contrast' among colours ofwhich Wingenstein writes.
But it is also more complicated than this, since the lower orange area is
marked by barely perceptible divisions and, on closer scrutiny. the
yellow as well is by no means chromatically uniform or even in regard
to the handling of the paint. Traces of what appears to he an orange
underlayer show where the yellow has been less thickly applied. In this
way the painting tends to turn into an ensemble of slight differences.
How do these 'minor' differences interact with the 'major' difference?
Does one difference detract from another, or does the picture in fact
present their nonassimilable co-existence? This is one place, perhaps,
where a 'play element' enters Rothko's painting-as if the work were
designed to lure the spectator, one difference camouflaging another
difference-<>r the series of differences constituting the work-in this
way both masking and revealing the difference of the similar.
In the works mentioned above varying complexions of what could
be called pure and impure differences co-exist, in each case setting a
'pure' colour with and against one or more 'nonpure' or secondary
tone. What I am calling Rothko's signature paintings consistently
elaborate such a movement between starkly contrasted areas and
intervals in which differences of colour or tone are minimal, barely
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visible. We will consider now how the relative indeterminacy of
nuance in Rothko's painting also enacts the ambivalence with which
the motifofpurity bears on the tradition ofmodernist abstract painting.
If this play of tones is an aspect ofRothko's painting that strikes the
viewer, it may be because, as Michel Butor points out, these paintings
retain an elusive resemblance to Mondrian's. As with Mondrian, there
is a recurrence of a format that is typically recognisable, yet which
invariably varies from painting to painting. What is striking about the
format in question is the extent to which it deviates from Mondrian's
while appearing to follow from it, the extent to which Rothko seems
literally to dissolve or half-dissolve the pictorial order of Mondrian's
work. Apart from the evident difference in chromatic and tonal range,
this dissolution occurs in the blurring of borders, in the elimination of
dividing lines and squares, and in the repeated 'Jacob's ladder' format
in Rothko's painting that, Butor suggests, looks like a close-up detail
ofa Mondrian grid.33 Rothko discolours, crops and blurs a pattern that,
at the least, recalls the pattern of Mondrian's painting. The pattern of
Rothko's painting, which never appears as such, is (like Mondrian's)
the remainder of a process of elimination. For Butor, it is as if painting
has been 'bathed': Rothko's blurring and tonal differences 'empty' and
'silence' the field of the picture even more than Mondrian's clearly-
defined compositions. From this perspective, Rothko not only continues
Mondrian's work of elimination, but goes further; the scene his work
presents is one of purification and jUdgment.34
Yet the complexity of the paintings, with their painterly handling,
veils of paint, and tonal sophistication, also resists Butor's reading. It
is this complexity that also makes it difficult to incorporate Rothko's
painting into the tradition of colourism or to align it with the flatness
that would be the motif of a Greenbergian formalism. We can recall
the differences by which Rothko distinguishes his colours from the
'laboratory tools' of colourism: their lack of purity, isolation, and
identity, their debt to 'experience'. And yet in so far as Rothko's
paintings consist in nothing other than chromatic movements which
interfere with any such identity or purity, they take to an extreme the
work of elimination that would be a recurrent motif of the modernist
tradition in the wake of Kant. In this sense Rothko abstracts from the
impurity of 'experience' in such a way that all that remains of it is pure
colour (this Rothko concedes: 'yes, that's all there is'). Here, then, a
contamination of the 'pure' is coincident with an ahstraction of the
'impure'; it is this paradoxical movement that gives these paintings
both their recognisability (as 'Rothkos') and their peculiar lack of
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'specified identity'. Rothko writes elsewhere of an art that must
'pulverise' the 'familiar identity of things' .35
Such a demand perhaps finds an echo in Lyotard's analysis of
nuance as that which escapes any form of chromatic coding. Here, in
the essay 'After the Sublime', Lyotard is also concerned with timbre in
music:
Nuance and timbre are scarcely perceptible differences between sounds
or colours which are otherwise identical in terms of the determination
of their physical parameters ... Within the tiny space occupied by a
note or a colour in the sound- or colour-continuum. which corresponds
to the identity card for the note or the colour. timhre or nuance
introduce a sort of infinity, the indeterminacy of the harmonics within
the frame determined by this identity. Nuance or timbre are the distress
and despair of the exact division and thus the clear composition of
sounds and colors according to graded scales and hannonic
temperaments ... The matter I'm talking about is 'immaterial',
anobjectablc. because it can only 'take place' or find its occasion at the
price of suspending [the) active powers of the mind.36
One might object that here Lyotard has already circumscribed the
limits of nuance. How otherwise is it possible to discern these 'scarcely
perceptible differences'-to identify them? Difference, here as
elsewhere. cannot be thought without some identity. just as, in Rothko's
painting, nuancing takes place through a certain chromatic economy of
kinship and contrast, continuity and discontinuity. occurring in an
identifiable work-and hetwcen other, likewise identifiable works. In
this sense the paintings consist not so much in colour pure and simple
as in a decomposition or seduction of colour. The slight differences
they exhibit closely approximate the 'ungraspable' differences of
nuance as Lyotard describes them here. The non-cognitive condition
necessary to what Lyotard calls a 'passibility' to nuance is also
relevant here.37 Referring to the suspension of the active powers of the
mind that this passibility demands, Lyotard evidently follows Kant's
distinction between aesthetic judgment and objective, cognitive
judgment; at the same time, by taking nuance as a 'presence' that
is simultaneously material and immaterial, Lyotard complicates the
purity of the Kantian distinction. We could also say that when Rothko
demands a 'pure response' to his work,38 and when he prefers to speak
of its communication of 'basic human emotions-tragedy, ecstasy.
doom, and so on'39- rather than viewing it in formal, chromatic or
even aesthetic terms, this insistence remains indebted to the modem
aesthetic tradition. In the same way, Rothko's refusal of colourism
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accords with the restrictions Kant imposes on the ~xtent to which
colour can contribute to pure aesthetic judgment. More particularly,
Lyotard's evocation of nuance and passibility leaves painting open to
precisely the emotions that Rothko insists on. The emotion of art is also
what Barthes, when he speaks of nuance, seeks to defend; and emotion
is of course the particular character of sublime feeling-also called a
'negative pleasure' -as Kant qualifies it in the Critique of}udgment..w
For Lyotard, what is at stake in the purity and the disinterestedness
that Kant demands of aesthetic judgment or aestheticexperience is this
relatively pure or empty state of passibility to nuance, which makes
possible a nuancing of different modes of thought and feeling. This
passibility-which recalls the 'negation of attention' by which Kant
characterises philosophical abstraction-would be the necessary
precondition, or propaideutic, for discernment and differentiation in
general. Regardless of whether such disinterestedness or passibility
occurs, it is the degree zero of critical reflection. The optimal surface
for the art of judgment would, in this sense, be 'blank'; in less absolute
terms, judgment demands a certain aesthetic suspension of time in
time, a fold in time discontinuous with 'countable' time and yet never
absolutely outside it.41 Lyotard's revision of Kant's thinking ofaesthetic
judgment perhaps runs the risk ofmystic aestheticism, as Alain Badiou
has suggested. Even so (and here, perhaps, Lyotard is close to Kant and
Wittgenstein), the 'mystic' element in Lyotard's thought, if we accept
this designation, nevertheless contributes to a rigorous elaboration of
what is at stake in aesthetic purity-that is, the minimal yet always
excessive condition ofa critical sensitivity to differences. In contrast to
the model of purity constructed by Cheetham, Lyotard accents the
specificity of aesthetic purity with respect to modernity in a way that
attests to its force and its demand.
At the end ofthe essay'After the Sublime', Lyotard suggests that in
the order of thought, a difference analogous to that of nuance in
painting makes itselffeIt with words. Perhaps recalling the structure of
iterability and alteration which in Derrida's thought opens writing-
and the mark in general-to alterity,42 Lyotard intimates a way of
thinking past any simple distinction that places 'discursivity' apart
from-or above-a non-discursive realm that is J>urely or merely
aesthetic. Looking at Orange and Red on Red (1957), we see, and read,
the difference of the nuance and the difference of the word, and the
differential interval between word and nuance. Could it not be said
that the same applies not only to other paintings by Rothko with less
marked plays on repetition in their titles, but to any painting and the
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title it bears? No doubt, and yet the singularity of Rothko's signature is
that in a sense the work to which it is most often tied does nothing more
than multiply this nuancing. To the extent that Rothko's paintings
eliminate from painting everything but this nuancing, to the extent that
they consist 'purely' in this movement of difference and repetition,
their singularity is to mark it as a general condition of painting. Taking
Lyotard's view of nuance as at once material and immaterial, pure and
impure, Rothko's work would figure as the limit-case of a painting
dedicated purely to this law of nuance-and to the nuancing of 'pure'
painting.
Returning to Cheetham's The Rhetoric ofPurity, we can say that it
shows a facet of the motif of purity in modern art when it claims:
The state of purity envisioned by ahstract painting in tllis tradition is
profoundly conservative in tlle sense tllat it remembers an ultimate
past autllority very like tlle complete unity of Plalo's Forms, and
because it striclly curtails any further change.43
Following Cheetham's line of argument, one might speak of an
endemic essentialism at work in astatement like the following made by
Rothko, writing in Tiger's Eye in 1949:
The progression of a painter's work, as it travels in time from point to
point, will be toward clarity: toward tlle elimination of all obstacles
between tlle painter and tlle idea. between tlle idea and tlle obscrver.44
Yet, as I have anempted to show, this statement. and the manner of its
bearing on Rothko's work, also points in other directions. With regard
to the clarity which is or should be the destiny of a painter's work, we
can recall a later allusion to clarity, made nearly a decade after the
statement in Tiger's Eye: the 'clarity' mentioned in Rothko's comments
at the Pran Institute cited earlier. on the nature of his 'involvement' in
colour. At issue on this occasion is the use of line which 'would have
detracted from the clarity of what I had to say'. Vestigial colour and an
elimination or obsolescence of line are now traits of paintings which
are 'very exact ... in weighing the edges', paintings where a 'shimmer'
or 'play element' co-cxists with acertain 'exactitude'. Rothko's anempt
to articulate what takes place in his painting approaches with some
precision a description of the prefiguring work of the monogram that
Kant evokes, favourably and unfavourably, when signalling an art of
judgment. It is as if these paintings were designed to mark precisely the
'manifold variations' of that indeterminate, shadowy or floating form,
that 'blurred sketch' emanating from the Kantian imagination,
sometimes working in a 'pure' capacity, sometimes drawing from
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'diverse experiences'. I will conclude with Barthes' writing about Cy
Twombly's work, and yet perhaps also about Rothko's painting and
the particular idea towards which it travels.
The truth of the red is in the smear ... Ideas (in the Platonic sense) are
not shiny, metallic figures in conceptual corsets, but somewhat shaky
maculations, tenuous blemishes on a vague background.45
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